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1.1 Introduction
A standard policy prescription in exchange rate crises is to tighten mon-
etary policy, at least until the exchange rate has stabilized. Indeed, in the
East Asian countries whose currencies collapsed in 1997, interest rates were
raised, usually quite dramatically. For example, short-term rates rose from
12 to 30 percent in the space of a month in December 1997 in South Korea.
The successful recovery from the crisis may seem to vindicate this policy.
However, that is not clear. High interest rates weaken the financial posi-
tion of debtors, perhaps inducing bankruptcies in firms that are debt con-
strained only because of informational imperfections. The countries might
have recovered, perhaps with less transitional diﬃculty, had an alternative,
less restrictive, policy been followed. This has been argued forcefully by, for
example, Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Radelet and Sachs (1998).
There is mixed empirical evidence on the relationship between interest
and exchange rates, even for developed countries (Eichenbaum and Evans
1995; Grilli and Roubini 1996). For countries that have undergone currency
crises, Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) found that, on average, dramatic in-
creases in interest rates have been associated with currency appreciations.
However, there was no clear association for a subsample of countries that
have undergone a banking crisis along with a currency crisis. This sub-
sample includes the East Asian countries.
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Papers that focus on the 1997 currency crises in East Asia also produce
mixed results. Representative results from papers using weekly or daily data
are as follows. Goldfajn and Baig (1998) decided that the evidence is mixed
but on balance favor the view that higher interest rates were associated with
appreciations in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thai-
land. Cho and West (2000) concluded that interest rate increases led to ex-
change rate appreciation in Korea during the crisis. Dekle, Hsiao, and
Wang (2001) found sharp evidence that interest rate changes are reduced-
form predictors of subsequent exchange rate appreciations in Korea,
Malaysia, and Thailand, though with long and variable lags. Finally, Gould
and Kamin (2000) were unable to find a reliable relationship between inter-
est rates and exchange rates in the five countries.
This paper conducts an empirical study of the relationship between ex-
change rates and interest rates during the 1997–98 exchange rate crises in
Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Our central question is: in these
economies, did exogenous monetary-policy-induced increases in the inter-
est rate cause exchange rate depreciation or appreciation? Our central con-
tribution is to propose a model that identifies a monetary policy rule, in a
framework general enough to allow either answer to our central question.
Our starting point is the observation that the sign of the correlation be-
tween exchange and interest rates—used in many previous studies to decide
whether an increase in interest rates causes an exchange rate appreciation—
will be suﬃcient to answer our question only if monetary policy shocks are
the dominant source of movements in exchange and interest rates. Since
shocks to perceived exchange rate risk are also arguably an important
source of variability during an exchange rate crisis, one must specify a
model that allows one to distinguish the eﬀects of the two types of shocks.
We do so with a model that has two equations and is linear. One equation
is interest parity, with a time-varying risk premium. Importantly, we allow
the risk premium to depend on the level of the interest rate. The second
equation is a monetary policy rule, with the interest rate as the instrument.
The two variables in the model are the exchange rate and domestic interest
rate. These two variables are driven by two exogenous shocks, a monetary
policy shock and a shock to the component of the exchange rate risk pre-
mium not dependent on the level of the interest rate. The model has two key
parameters. One parameter (a) indexes how strongly the monetary author-
ity leans against incipient exchange rate movements. The other parameter
(d ) indexes the sensitivity of exchange rate risk premiums to the level of in-
terest rates.
Whether interest rates should be increased or decreased to stabilize a de-
preciating exchange rate depends on how sensitive risk premiums are to in-
terest rates. Interest rates should be increased unless risk premiums are
strongly increasing with the level of the interest rate. This is the orthodox
policy. Interest rates should be lowered if risk premiums are strongly posi-
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tively related to the interest rate. This is the view of Furman and Stiglitz
(1998). Our model precisely defines “strongly positive” as meaning that the
parameter d referenced in the previous paragraph is greater than 1.
According to our model, the sign of the correlation between exchange and
interest rates suﬃces to reveal whether exogenous increases in interest rates
led to exchange rate appreciation only if shocks to monetary policy dominate
the movement of exchange and interest rates. Suppose instead that shocks to
the exchange rate risk premium are the primary source of movements in ex-
change and interest rates. Then in our model, the correlation between the
two variables may be positive even if, in the absence of risk premium shocks,
increases in interest rates would have stabilized a depreciating exchange rate
(i.e., d  1). (We measure exchange rates so that a larger value means depre-
ciation. Thus, a positive correlation means that high interest rates are asso-
ciated with a depreciated exchange rate.) The correlation between the two
may be negative even if interest rate increases would have destabilized ex-
change rates (i.e., d  1) in the absence of risk premium shocks.
Using a special case of our model, we find that exchange rate risk premi-
ums in Korea were inversely related to the level of interest rates. In the
Philippines, risk premiums were increasing in interest rates, though mod-
estly so. In both these countries, stabilization required raising interest rates.
In Thailand, on the other hand, risk premiums were strongly increasing, in
the precise sense that the parameter referenced in the preceding paragraph
was estimated to be greater than 1. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, an exoge-
nous increase in the interest rate led to exchange rate appreciation in Korea
and the Philippines, and exchange rate depreciation in Thailand.
Unfortunately, confidence intervals for model parameters are huge. They
do not rule out the possibility that interest rate increases led to depreciation
in Korea and the Philippines, to appreciation in Thailand. To a certain ex-
tent this seems to follow unavoidably from the fact that our sample sizes are
small, as is suggested by the similarly weak evidence found in most of the
papers cited above. A second reason our results are tentative is that for
tractability and ease of interpretation we base our inference particularly
simple assumptions about the behavior of unobservable shocks. These as-
sumptions are roughly consistent with the data, but alternative, more com-
plex models no doubt would fit better. Moreover, we use an ineﬃcient esti-
mation technique. A final reason our results are tentative is that we do not
allow for the possibility of destabilizing monetary policy, that is, a period
during which a monetary authority moved interest rates in a destabilizing
direction, perhaps before adopting a policy that ultimately led to exchange
rate stabilization. We leave all such tasks to future research.
We also leave to future research the larger, and more important, issue
about what constitutes good policy in an exchange rate crisis. High interest
rates may be bad policy even if they stabilize exchange rates, and may be
good policy even if they do not. We believe that our paper contributes to our
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understanding the larger issue, since any policy analysis must take a stand
on the interest rate–exchange rate relationship. In our own work, brief dis-
cussions of policy during the Korean crisis may be found in Cho and Hong
(2000) and Cho and West (1999).
Section 1.2 describes our model, section 1.3 our data, and section 1.4 our
results. Section 1.5 concludes. An appendix contains some technical details.
1.2 Model
Our simple linear model has three equations and two observable vari-
ables. The three equations are interest parity, a relationship between ex-
change rate risk and interest rates, and an interest rate reaction function
(monetary policy rule). The two variables are the domestic interest rate and
the exchange rate.
We write interest parity as
(1) it  it∗  Etst1  st  dt.
In equation (1), it and it∗ are (net) domestic (i.e., Asian) and foreign nominal
interest rates; st is 100  log of the nominal spot exchange rate, with higher
values indicating depreciation; Et denotes expectations; dt is a risk pre-
mium. If dt  0, equation (1) is uncovered interest parity. The variable dt,
which may be serially correlated, captures default risk as well as the famil-
iar premium due to risk aversion.
It presumably is safe to view it∗ as substantially unaﬀected by domestic
(Asian) monetary policy. The same cannot be assumed for Etst1, st, and dt,
all of which are determined simultaneously with it. However, for the mo-
ment we follow some previous literature (e.g., Furman and Stiglitz 1998)
and perform comparative statics using equation (1) alone. Evidently, if it is
increased, but Etst1 and dt are unchanged, then st must fall (appreciate): the
orthodox relationship. If, as well, increases in interest rates today cause con-
fidence that the exchange rate will stay strong (i.e., that st1 will be lower
than it would have been in the absence of an interest rate hike), then st must
fall even farther for equation (1) to hold.
However, this channel will be oﬀset insofar as increases in it are associ-
ated with increases in dt. Such a rise may come about because higher inter-
est rates are associated with higher default rates, or because higher interest
rates raise risk premiums. This, in turn, may lead to expectations of depre-
ciation (increase) in st1. Furman and Stiglitz (1998) argue on this basis that
equation (1) alone does not tell us even whether increases in it will be as-
sociated with increases or decreases in st, let alone the magnitude of the
change.
We agree with this argument. Our aim is to specify a model that allows
for the possibility of either a positive or negative response of st to an exoge-
nous monetary-policy-induced increase in it, and then to estimate the model
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to quantify the sign and size of the eﬀect. To that end, we supplement the
interest parity condition in equation (1) with two additional equations. The
first is a simple monetary policy rule. We assume that the nominal interest
rate is the instrument of monetary policy. During a period of exchange rate
crisis, the focus of monetary policy arguably is on stabilizing the exchange
rate. We therefore assume
(2) it  a(Et1st  st)  u˜mt.
In equation (2), a is a parameter, and st is the target exchange rate. Con-
ventional interpretation of International Monetary Fund (IMF) policy is
that the IMF argues for a  0. This means that the monetary authority
leans against expected exchange rate depreciations. Of course, a  0 means
that the monetary authority lowers the interest rate in anticipation of de-
preciation. For simplicity, we impound the target level into the unobserv-
able disturbance u˜mt. Upon defining umt  u˜mt – ast, equation (2) becomes
(2) it  aEt1st  umt.
The variable umt, which may be serially correlated, captures not only
changes in the target level of the exchange rate, but all other variables that
aﬀect monetary policy. Ultimately it would be of interest to model umt’s de-
pendence on observable variables such as it∗ and the level of foreign re-
serves; once again, we suppose that in the crisis period it is reasonable to fo-
cus on the exchange rate as the dominant determinant of interest rate policy.
The “exogenous monetary policy induced increase in it” referenced in the
previous paragraph is captured by a surprise increase in umt.
Note the dating of expectations: period t expectations appear in equation
(1), period t – 1 expectations in equation (2). This reflects the view that as-
set market participants, whom we presume to be setting exchange rates, re-
act more quickly than does the monetary authority to news about exchange
rate risk premiums (i.e., to shocks to the variable that we call udt, below).
Capturing this view by using t – 1 expectations in the monetary rule is most
appealing when data frequency is high. Accordingly, we assume daily deci-
sion making, and allow for the eﬀects of time aggregation when we estimate
our model using weekly data. Of course, we do not literally believe that in
setting the interest rate each day the monetary authority is ignorant of in-
traday developments. Rather, we take this as a tractable approximation.
The final equation is one that relates the risk premium dt to the interest
rate it.
(3) dt  dit  u˜dt
Equation (3) is an equilibrium relationship between risk premiums and in-
terest rates. In the conventional view, d  0, in which case higher interest
rates are associated with lower risk, or perhaps d  0, in which case there is
no link between interest rates and risk. The d  0 interpretation seems con-
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sistent with Fischer (1998, 4), who argues that temporarily raising interest
rates restores confidence. In an alternative view, such as that of Furman and
Stiglitz (1998), d  0, and higher interest rates are associated with higher
risk. We suppose that d is structural, in the sense that one can think of d as
remaining fixed while one varies the monetary policy reaction parameter a.
Obviously this cannot hold for arbitrarily wide variation in a, but perhaps
is a tolerable assumption for empirically plausible variation in a.
The variable u˜dt captures all other factors that determine the risk pre-
mium. Ultimately it would be of interest to partially proxy u˜dt with observ-
able variables. Candidate variables include the level of reserves and debt de-
nominated in foreign currency (see Cho and West 2000) for the role such
variables played in Korea). However, because such data are not available at
high frequencies, for simplicity we treat u˜dt as unobservable and exogenous.
To simplify notation, and for consistency with our empirical work, we
impound it∗ in the unobservable disturbance to interest parity, defining udt 
it∗  u˜dt. We then combine equations (3) and (1) to obtain
(4) (1  d )it  Etst1  st  udt.
Equations (2) and (4) are a two-equation system for the two variables it and
st. Upon substituting equation (2) into equation (4) and rearranging, we
obtain
(5) st  a(1  d )Et1st  Etst1  udt  (1  d )umt.
Equation (5) is a first-order stochastic diﬀerence equation in st. To solve
it, we assume homogeneous and model-consistent expectations. That is, we
assume that private-sector and government expectations are consistent
with one another, in that the variables used in forming Et–1 in equations (2)
and (2) are the period t – 1 values of the period t variables used in forming
Et in equations (1) and (4). Moreover, these expectations are consistent with
the time series properties of udt and umt. To make these assumptions opera-
tional, we assume as well that Et denotes expectations conditional on cur-
rent and lagged values of udt and umt (equivalently, current and lagged values
of st and it).
Define b  [1  a(1 – d )]–1. We make the stability assumption 0  b  1
and the “no bubbles” assumption limj→b
jEt–1stj  0. The stability as-
sumption requires
(6) a  0, d  1 or a  0, d  1.
The algebraic condition in equation (6) captures the following common-
sense stability condition. Suppose risk premiums are so sensitive to interest
rates that d  1. Stability then requires that the monetary authority lower
interest rates (a  0) in response to anticipated depreciations. For if it in-
stead raised interest rates, we would have the following neverending spiral:
A positive shock to the risk premium causes exchange rates to depreciate,
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which with a  0 causes the monetary authority to raise interest rates,
which with d  1 causes a further depreciation and a further raising of in-
terest rates. . . . Similarly, if d  1, stability requires increasing interest rates
in the face of anticipated depreciation. Note that one can have a stable sys-
tem when a  0 even if d  0, as long as d  1: In our model, a policy of
leaning against exchange rate depreciations (a  0) is stable even if increases
in interest rates are associated with increased risk (d  0), as long as the in-
crease in risk is not too large (d  1).
To solve the model, project both sides of equation (5) onto period t – 1 in-
formation, and then solve recursively forward. The result is
(7) Et1st  b∑

j0
{b jEt1[udtj  (1  d )umtj ]}.
For given processes of udt and umt, we can solve for Et–1st using equation (7).
Putting this solution into equation (2) yields it, which in turn may be used
in equation (4) to solve for st.
The data we use are to a certain extent consistent with a random walk for
both umt and udt, say,
(8) umt  umt1  emt, udt  udt1  edt.
Such shocks make for quick, one-period movements from one steady state
to another in response to a shock. They are special in other ways as well, as
noted below. Under the assumption that emt and edt are uncorrelated with
one another, figures 1.1–1.4 plot responses of it and st to 1 percent increases
in emt and edt, for each of four parameter sets: a  0.2, d  –9; a  0.7, d 
–9; a  0.7, d  0.6; a  –0.5, d  1.2.
Figure 1.1 plots the response of it to a 1 percent increase in emt. Only one
line is plotted because for all four parameter sets, response is identical. As
is obvious from equation (2), the impact response is a 1 percent increase.
The interest rate then returns to initial value. That is, a permanent increase
in umt leads to a transitory change in it. Evidently, from equation (2), in
steady state st must fall by 1/a (i.e., rise by –1/a when a  0). This depicted
in figure 1.2. Consider first the case in which a  0. Then an exogenous in-
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Fig. 1.1 Response of it to a 1 percent
shock to emt
Fig. 1.2 Response of st to a 1 percent
shock to emt
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Fig. 1.3 Response of st to a 1 percent
shock to edt
Fig. 1.4 Response of it to a 1 percent
shock to edt
crease in the interest rate causes an exchange rate appreciation: with a  0,
exogenous increases in interest rates stabilize a depreciating exchange rate.
In the three specifications with a  0, the impact elasticity ranges from
about –2 to –15. For given d, the impact eﬀect is smaller for a  0.7 than for
a  0.2: larger a means a harsher monetary policy response and greater ex-
change rate stability. On the other hand, when a  0, an exogenous increase
in the interest rate causes the exchange rate to depreciate.
These long responses are of course consistent with long-run neutrality of
monetary policy. An increase in emt means a commitment to raise the in-
terest rate for any given expected level of exchange rates, now and forever.
Because the level of the exchange rate adjusts in the long run, there is no
long-run eﬀect on the rate of exchange rate depreciation, and therefore
no long-run eﬀect on the level of the interest rate.
Figure 1.3 depicts the response of st to a 1 percent increase in the risk pre-
mium. In all specifications, the exchange rate increases in both the short
and the long run. The impact eﬀect is greater than the long-run eﬀect be-
cause according to equation (2) it takes a period before interest rates re-
spond to the increased risk. For given d, the response is less for larger a; for
given a, the response is greater for larger d.
Figure 1.4 plots the response of it to a 1 percent increase in the risk pre-
mium. By assumption, there is no contemporaneous response. When a  0,
the interest rate is increased; when a  0, it is decreased. When a is larger in
absolute value, there is a larger increase. In accordance with equation (4),
the long-run response of it is 1/(1 – d ), and thus it is governed only by d but
not a; in the simple random-walk specification, the long run is achieved in
one period and so the responses for (a  0.2)/(d  –9) and (a  0.7)/(d 
–9) are identical.
Some implications of the above are worth noting. First, upon comparing
the figures, we see that when a  0, risk premium shocks cause interest and
exchange rates to move in the same direction, while monetary shocks cause
them to move in opposite directions. For a  0, risk premium shocks cause
interest and exchange rates to move in the opposite direction, while mone-
tary shocks cause them to move in the same direction. This result holds not
only for random-walk shocks but also for arbitrary stationary AR(1)
shocks.
The implication is that the sign of the correlation between interest and ex-
change rates is not suﬃcient to tell us that interest rate hikes stabilized a de-
preciating currency. A negative correlation may result when a  0 because
the data are dominated by risk premium shocks. A positive correlation may
result when a  0 because the data are dominated by risk premium shocks.
Second, suppose one takes a as a choice parameter for a monetary au-
thority that aims to stabilize a rapidly depreciating exchange rate. If ex-
change rate risk does not rapidly increase with the level of interest rates (d
 1), then the monetary authority should raise interest rates (set a  0)
when further depreciation is expected. However, if exchange rate risk does
rapidly increase with the level of interest rates (d  1), then the monetary
authority should lower interest rates (set a  0) when further depreciation
is expected. In either case, stabilization smoothes exchange rates.
A third point is that with random-walk shocks—an assumption we
maintain in our empirical work—this stabilization of exchange rates will in-
duce a negative first-order autocorrelation in 	st. That is, smoothing in the
face of random-walk shocks causes exchange rates to exhibit some mean
reversion relative to a random-walk benchmark. (Our model is capable of
generating positive autocorrelation in 	st, but only if the shocks exhibit dy-
namics beyond that of a random walk.)
Finally, with random-walk shocks, one can read the sign of 1 – d, and
hence whether d is above or below the critical value of 1, directly from the
sign of the correlation between 	it and 	st–1. When d is less than 1, this cor-
relation is positive; when d is greater than 1, this correlation is negative: If
stabilization involves increasing (decreasing) interest rates in response to in-
cipient exchange rate depreciations, then, naturally, 	it will be positively
(negatively) correlated with 	st–1. Again, this simple result applies because we
assume random-walk shocks and need not hold for richer shock processes.
1.3 Data and Estimation Technique
We obtained daily data for Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, either
directly from Bloomberg or indirectly from others who reported Bloomberg
as the ultimate source. The mnemonics for exchange rates are KRW (Ko-
rea), PHP (the Philippines), and THB (Thailand). The mnemonics for in-
terest rates are KWCRIT (Korea), PPCALL (the Philippines: Philippine
Peso Interbank Call Rate), and BITBCALL (Thailand: Thai STD Char-
tered Bank Call Rate). Because many days were missing, we constructed
weekly data by sampling Wednesday of each week. If Wednesday was not
available we used Thursday; if Thursday was not available we used Tuesday.
Interest rates are expressed at annual rates; exchange rates are versus the
U.S. dollar.
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We start our samples so that we are two weeks into what arguably can be
considered the postcrisis exchange rate targeting regime. Two weeks allows
both the current and lagged value of interest and exchange rate diﬀerences
to fall inside the new regime. For Thailand and the Philippines, this means
a start date of Wednesday, 23 July 1997. (As noted above, our weekly data
are for Wednesday.) For Korea, the date is Wednesday, 17 December 1997.
We ended our samples one year later (sample size of 53 weeks), since the
simple monetary rule (eq. [2]) probably did not well describe policy once the
countries had stabilized. We also tried 27-week samples, with little change
in results. Figures 1.5–1.7 plot our data, in levels. The dashed lines delimit
our one-year samples.
Formal unit root tests failed to reject the null of a unit root. Hence, we ex-
amine interest and (log) exchange rates in first diﬀerences. We failed to find
cointegration between it and st. (Using similar weekly data, Gould and
Kamin 2000 and Dekle, Hsiao, and Wang 2001 also failed to find cointe-
gration.) Hence, in our regression work (mentioned briefly below) we esti-
mated a vector autoregression (VAR) in 	it and 	st without including an er-
ror correction term. We note in passing that the lack of cointegration meant
that we could not turn to estimation of a cointegrating vector to identify the
monetary policy parameter a.
To identify a and d, we assume that umt and udt follow random walks. In
this case, our model implies a vector MA(1) process for (	it, 	st), which, as
explained in the next section, is more or less consistent with our data. We
allow the innovations in umt and udt to be contemporaneously correlated.
Such a correlation might result, for example, if the level of foreign reserves
importantly aﬀected both monetary policy and exchange rate risk. Because
we allow this correlation, it will not be meaningful to decompose the varia-
tion of exchange or interest rates into monetary and risk components. (We
do not, however, model or exploit cross-country correlations in udt or umt, de-
ferring to future work the attractive possibility of using information in such
correlations.) We allow for decisions to be made daily rather than weekly.
That is, we assume that the model described in section 1.2 generates the data
with a time period corresponding to one day. However, we sample the data
only once every five observations.
We use five moments to compute the five parameters a and d and the three
elements of the variance-covariance matrix of (emt, edt). The moments we
used included three chosen because they were estimated relatively precisely:
var (	it), var (	st) and corr (	it, 	st). The final two moments used, corr (	it,
	st–1) and corr (	st, 	st–1), were largely chosen for clarity and convenience.
As explained at the end of section 1.2 above, our model has simple and di-
rect implications for the signs of these correlations. As a technical matter,
with this choice of moments, the parameters could be solved for analyti-
cally, although the equations are nonlinear.
An appendix gives details on how we mapped moments into parameters.
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Fig. 1.6 Overnight interest rate and peso/dollar exchange rate, the Philippines
Fig. 1.5 Overnight interest rate and won/dollar exchange rate, Korea
Fig. 1.7 Overnight interest rate and baht/dollar exchange rate, Thailand
Two points about the mapping are worth noting here. The first is that since
the five equations are nonlinear, in principle they can yield no reasonable
solutions. For example, for a given set of moments, the implied value of the
variance of edt might be negative. The second is that our algorithm solves for
a from a root to a quadratic. If the estimated first-order autocorrelation
of 	st is between –0.5 and 0, this quadratic is guaranteed to have two real
roots, one implying a positive value of a, the other a negative value. We
chose the root consistent with stability: the root implying a positive value
of aˆ if dˆ  1, a negative value if dˆ  1. (The solution algorithm is in part
recursive, with d estimated prior to a.) We made this choice because an
unstable solution implies explosive data, at least if the unstable policy is
expected to be maintained indefinitely; this is inconsistent with our use
of sample moments.
We report 90 percent confidence intervals. These are “percentile me-
thod” intervals, constructed by a nonparametric bootstrap using block re-
sampling with nonoverlapping blocks. Details are in the appendix.
1.4 Empirical Results
Table 1.1 has variances and auto- and cross-correlations for lags 0, 1, and
2, with the bootstrap confidence intervals in parentheses. A skim of the
table reveals that virtually all the auto- and cross-correlations are insignifi-
cantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10 percent level. The only exceptions are
the correlations between 	st and 	it–1 in the shorter sample in Korea, be-
tween 	it and 	it–1 in the longer sample in the Philippines, and between 	it
and 	st in both samples in Thailand. (We did not report confidence inter-
vals for var[	it] and var[	st] in table 1.1; all point estimates of these vari-
ances were significant at the 90 percent level—indeed, at any significance
level—by construction.)
The insignificance of the point estimates at lag 2 is consistent with a vec-
tor MA(1) process for (	it, 	st), because population auto- and cross-
correlations will all be zero for lags 2 and higher for such a process. This is
the main sense in which a random walk for umt and udt implies a process more
or less consistent with the data. As well, the estimates of the first-order
autocorrelation of 	st is negative in all samples, though barely so for the
Philippines and Thailand in the one-year samples (point estimates  –0.07
and –0.02); as noted in section 1.2 above, a negative autocorrelation is im-
plied by our model if shocks are random walks.
On the other hand, the insignificance of the point estimates at lag 1, and
of the contemporaneous correlation between 	it and 	st in Korea and the
Philippines, is bad news for our MA(1) model, and, in our view, for any em-
pirical study of these data. Because the data are noisy, estimates of model
parameters—which of course will be drawn from moments such as those re-
ported in table 1.1—will likely be imprecise. That, perhaps, is an inevitable
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consequence of our decision to focus on a sample small enough that it a pri-
ori seemed likely to have a more or less stable interest rate rule.
We note in passing that when a second-order VAR in (	it, 	st) is esti-
mated for one-year samples, F-tests (not reported in the table) yield slightly
sharper results. Specifically, the null of no predictability is rejected for
lagged interest rates in the 	it equation in the Philippines and for lagged ex-
change rate changes in both the 	it and the 	st equations in Korea but not
otherwise. This suggests the importance of allowing for richer dynamics in
the shocks, an extension suggested as well by the fact that the absolute value
of the Philippine estimate of corr (	it, 	it–1) is greater than 0.5, a magnitude
inconsistent with 	it following an MA(1) process. We leave that as a task for
future research.
Using the algorithm described in the appendix and the previous section,
we estimated a and d from some moments reported in table 1.1. (The algo-
rithm also automatically produces estimates of the variance-covariance
matrix of (emt, edt), which we do not discuss because these are not of eco-
nomic interest.) Columns (3) and (4) in table 1.2 present these estimates,
again with 90 percent confidence intervals from a bootstrap given in paren-
theses. The algebraic values of the estimates of d are lowest for Korea and
highest for Thailand, with
(9) dˆ for Korea  0  dˆ for Philippines  1  dˆ for Thailand.
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Table 1.2 Parameter Estimates
% Response of st to a 1%
Shock to umt
Sample a d Impact Long-Run
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Korea 12/17/97–12/16/98 0.25 –8.87 –13.9 –4.1
(–0.05,0.35) (–27.7,14.2) (–43.9,36.3) (–15.2,12.1)
12/17/97–06/17/98 0.36 –11.27 –15.0 –2.8
(–0.12,0.37) (–27.7,39.4) (–46.8,61.7) (–20.6,17.0)
The Philippines 07/23/97–07/22/98 0.76 0.57 –1.8 –1.3
(–1.77,5.76) (–0.72,2.43) (–8.6,7.1) (–6.9,5.9)
07/23/97–01/21/98 1.12 0.31 –1.6 –0.9
(–2.70,9.04) (–0.92,3.25) (–6.7,7.5) (–3.8,4.9)
Thailand 07/23/97–07/22/98 –0.54 1.16 2.0 1.8
(–1.07,0.19) (–2.25,7.74) (–12.4,21.8) (–9.0,15.1)
07/23/97–01/21/98 –0.96 6.59 6.6 1.0
(–1.33,0.11) (–3.7,14.5) (–13.8,23.4) (–8.9,10.4)
Notes: a is a monetary policy reaction parameter defined in equation (2); d measures the sensitivity of ex-
change rate risk premia to the interest rate, as defined in equations (1) and (3). 90 percent confidence in-
tervals, from bootstrap, in parentheses. The elasticities in columns (5) and (6) are the response to a sur-
prise, permanent 1 percent increase in umt .
The implication is that in equilibrium, increases in interest rates were asso-
ciated with decreases in exchange rate risk in Korea. The association be-
tween interest rates and exchange rate risk was positive in the Philippines,
but suﬃciently small that if monetary policy is to be stabilizing, interest
rates must be increased in response to expected exchange rate depreciations
(a  0). The association is also positive in Thailand, with the estimated
value of d greater than 1. Hence if monetary policy is to be stabilizing in
Thailand, interest rates must be decreased in response to expected exchange
rate depreciations (a  0). As explained above, the signs of dˆ follow from
the signs of the estimates of the correlation between 	it and 	st–1; negative
in Thailand, positive in Korea and the Philippines.
As we feared, the confidence intervals on the estimates of a and d are
large; indeed, they are staggeringly large. Using a two-tailed test, one can
reject the null that a  0 in Korea in the one-year sample at the 16 percent
level (not reported in the table); all other parameters are even more impre-
cisely estimated.
Let us abstract from the confidence intervals and focus on the point esti-
mates. We do not know of estimates from other studies that can be used to
gauge directly the plausibility of the estimate of d. This ranking does con-
flict with Barsuto and Ghosh (2000), who concluded that real interest rate
hikes increased the exchange rate risk premium in Korea, decreased it in
Thailand. (Barsuto and Ghosh did not study the Philippines.) On the other
hand, it is our sense that the ranking in equation (9) accords with the view
that fundamentals were best in Korea, worst in Thailand. Moreover, the
bottom-line conclusion—that interest rate increases caused depreciation in
Thailand, appreciation in Korea and the Philippines—is consistent with
Goldfajn and Baig (1998, table 3, full sample estimates) and with Di Bella’s
(2000) findings for Thailand (Di Bella does not consider other Asian coun-
tries).
For all practical purposes, impulse responses to orthogonal movements
in emt and edt are given in figures 1.1–1.4. For Korea, see the lines for a  0.2,
d  –9; for the Philippines, see a  0.7, d  0.6; for Thailand, see a  0.5, d
 1.2. The exact responses of st to a 1 percent positive value of emt are given
in columns (5) and (6) of table 1.2. Once again, the confidence intervals are
very large, as is inevitable since these elasticities are simple transformations
of the estimates of a and d.
Now, Thailand’s agreements with the IMF called for Thailand to main-
tain interest rates in indicative ranges that were high relative to precrisis lev-
els (e.g., 12–17 percent in the August 1997 agreement [IMF 1997a, annex B],
15–20 percent in the December 1997 agreement [IMF 1997b, annex B].
Some agreements also suggested raising interest rates when the exchange
rate is under pressure (IMF 1997b, 1998). How can this be reconciled with
our Thai estimates (aˆ  0, dˆ  1), which indicate that the stabilization was
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accomplished by lowering interest rates in the face of incipient deprecia-
tion? One interpretation is that IMF increases appear in our data as occa-
sional and very visible large positive values of umt; most of the day-to-day
systematic component of policy implicitly lowered interest rates in the face
of incipient exchange rate depreciation, despite the agreement to raise in-
terest rates when the exchange rate was pressured. On this interpretation,
the appreciation would have occurred sooner absent the early increases in
interest rates. A second interpretation is that policy did raise interest rates
in the face of depreciation, both in the form of one-time increases early in
the sample, and systematically throughout the sample. However, sampling
error caused the estimate of d to be greater than 1 and thus the estimate
of a to be negative. (We refer to dˆ rather than aˆ because aˆ is solved from a
quadratic with one negative and one positive root, and we choose the root
consistent with stability: the root that yields aˆ  0 when dˆ  1, the root that
yields aˆ  0 when dˆ  1. See section 1.3 and the appendix.)
We do not have any direct evidence on either of these interpretations. We
hoped that some indirect evidence might be found by rolling the samples
forward, recomputing the estimates of a and d. Table 1.3 presents results of
such an exercise, for one-year samples, and for all three countries. We
dropped the initial observation as we added a final observation, keeping the
sample at T  53 weeks. In Korea and Thailand, we stopped the process
when the estimated first-order autocorrelation of 	st turned positive. That
date does not occur until January 1998 for the Philippines, and so to con-
serve space we stopped at September 1997.
The estimates for the Philippines and Thailand move little—surprisingly
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Table 1.3 Rolling Sample Estimates of a and d
Korea The Philippines Thailand
Start aˆ dˆ Start aˆ dˆ Start aˆ dˆ
12/17/97 0.24 –8.99 07/23/97 0.74 0.57 07/23/97 –0.53 1.16
12/24/97 0.48 –3.37 07/30/97 0.68 0.54 07/30/97 –0.54 1.12
12/31/97 0.41 –1.82 08/06/98 0.68 0.55 08/06/98 –0.54 1.13
01/07/98 0.29 –2.28 08/13/98 0.63 0.55 08/13/98 –0.52 1.14
01/14/98 0.31 –1.93 08/20/98 0.66 0.51 08/20/98 –0.49 1.21
01/21/98 0.35 –1.27 08/27/98 0.70 0.53 08/27/98 –0.53 1.29
01/28/98 0.35 –0.36 09/03/98 0.73 0.55 09/03/98 –0.58 1.39
02/06/98 n.a. n.a. 09/10/98 1.41 0.75 09/10/98 –0.56 1.31
02/13/98 n.a. n.a. 09/17/98 1.41 0.75 09/17/98 –0.59 1.14
02/20/98 n.a. n.a. 09/24/98 1.41 0.73 09/24/98 n.a. n.a.
Notes: The estimates of a and d are computed from 53-week samples with the indicated starting date. For
each country, the estimate in the first line repeats the figures in table 1.2. The algorithm used to map data
to parameters cannot be used when the estimate of the first-order autocorrelation of 	st is positive. The
n.a. entries flag samples in which the estimate of this autocorrelation is positive.
little, in light of the huge confidence intervals in the previous table. In the
Philippines, the estimate of d ranges from about 0.5 to 0.7; in Thailand, the
range is about 1.1 to 1.4. Moreover, the estimate of a does not fall, which
one might expect if Thailand systematically raised interest rates in response
to incipient exchange rate depreciation in the early but not the later parts of
the sample. Thus this exercise is not particularly helpful in interpreting the
results for Thailand.
One estimate that is quite sensitive to the sample is that for d, for Korea.
The estimated value rises rapidly, from –8.99 to –0.36. A possible rational-
ization of this pattern is that as a country stabilizes, exchange rate risk be-
comes insensitive to the level of the interest rate. Perhaps d  0 in developed
countries, or at least in countries without credit rationing (see Furman and
Stiglitz 1998). Clearly, however, this is a speculative interpretation, and the
large confidence intervals in table 1.2 make it reasonable to attribute the
wide variation to sampling error in estimation of d.
1.5 Conclusions
We have formulated and estimated a model that allows for interest rate
shocks to either appreciate or depreciate exchange rates. Using weekly data,
we have estimated a special case of the model using data from Korea, the
Philippines, and Thailand. We have found that an exogenous increase in in-
terest rates caused exchange rate appreciation in Korea and the Philippines,
depreciation in Thailand. The estimates are, however, quite noisy.
One set of priorities for future work is to use higher frequency data, allow
for richer shock processes, and use more eﬃcient estimation techniques. A
second is to allow for the possibility that for some period of time, monetary
policy was destabilizing, with a switch in the sign of the interest rate reac-
tion function necessary for stabilization. A third is to bring additional vari-
ables, such as the level of foreign reserves, into the model. A final, and
broad, aim of our future work is to use our knowledge of the relationship
between interest rates and exchange rates to analyze the macroeconomic
eﬀects of monetary policy in countries undergoing currency crises.
Appendix
Mapping from Moments to Model Parameters
Let udt and umt follow random walks
(A1) udt  udt1  edt, umt  umt1  emt,
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where edt and emt are vector white noise. Then the solution of the model is
(A2) it  (1  d )
1udt1  emt, 
st  (a
1  1  d )umt  (1  d )umt1  [1  (1  d )
1a1]udt  udt1.
Define u˜dt  (1 – d )
–1udt, e˜dt  (1 – d )
–1edt, 
  1 – d,   a
–1. Rewrite equation
(A2) as
(A3) it  u˜dt1  emt, st  (  
)(u˜dt  umt)  
(u˜dt1  umt1).
Suppose we sample data every n periods (n  5 in the computations in the
text). Then
(A4a) it  itn  e˜dt1  e˜dt2  . . .  e˜dtn  emt  emtn.
(A4b) st  stn  (  
)(e˜dt  emt)  (e˜dt1  emt1) 
 . . .  (e˜dtn1  emtn1)  
(e˜dtn  emtn).
Define 	nit  it – it–n, 	
nst  st – st–n, ˜md  cov (emt, e˜dt), ˜
2
d  var (e˜dt), 
2
m 
var (emt). Then
(A5) var (	ni)  n˜2d  2
2
m  2˜md,
(A6) var (	ns)  (n2  2
  2
2)(˜2d  
2
m  2˜md),
(A7) cov (	ni, 	ns)  [(n  1)   
]˜2d  (  2
)
2
m
 [(n  1)    3
]˜md,
(A8) cov (	ns, 	nsn)  
(  
)(˜
2
d  
2
m  2˜md),
(A9) cov (	ni, 	nsn)  (  
)(˜
2
d  
2
m  2˜md).
Equations (A5) to (A9) were used to solve for ˜2d, 
2
m, ˜md, , and 
. From
these, a and d can be computed. When cov (	ns, 	ns–n)  0, a quadratic that
is used to solve for  is guaranteed to have one negative and one positive
root. We chose the root consistent with stable monetary policy: the nega-
tive root when the estimate of d was greater than 1, the positive root other-
wise.
Description of Bootstrap Technique
The bootstrap confidence intervals in table 1.2 were based on 5,000 repli-
cations of the following procedure. Each replication was based on an artifi-
cial sample constructed by sampling, with replacement, nonoverlapping
blocks of size 6, from the actual data. For the larger sample (T  53 weeks),
we sampled the blocks from a sample of 54 weeks. We used 54 rather than
53 weeks so that the sample contained an integral multiple of blocks; the 54
weeks consisted of the 53 used in the estimation plus an additional week at
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the end of the sample (e.g., 12/17/97–12/23/98 for Korea). In the smaller
sample (T  27 weeks), we sampled the blocks from a sample of 30 weeks,
adding three weeks to the data used in estimates reported in the table (e.g.,
12/17/97–07/08/98 for Korea).
For each of the 5,000 samples, we applied the procedure used to obtain
the point estimates, to samples of size 53 or 27. We sorted the results from
lowest to highest. For the autocorrelations in table 1.1, the confidence in-
tervals were obtained by dropping the lowest and highest 5 percent of the
results (i.e., the 500 lowest and 500 highest). For the point estimates in table
1.2, we first dropped all results in which (1) the point estimate of the first-
order autocorrelation of 	st was positive or less than –0.5, or (2) the point
estimate of var (edt) or var (emt) was negative. The confidence intervals were
then obtained by dropping the lowest and highest 5 percent of the remain-
ing results. The number of observations that remained after dropping those
with inadmissable point estimates were as follows: Korea, 3,318 (T  53)
and 2,746 (T  27); the Philippines, 1,977 (T  53) and 2,728 (T  27);
Thailand, 1, 661 (T  53) and 2,285 (T  27). The relative paucity of re-
maining observations in the Philippines and Thailand for T  53 results
from a relatively large number of bootstrap samples in which the point esti-
mate of the first-order autocorrelation of 	st was positive.
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Comment Robert Dekle
During the recent East Asian currency crisis, the relationship between ex-
change rates and interest rates became a topic of intense controversy. The
traditional view stresses that tight monetary policies are necessary to sup-
port the exchange rate: higher interest rates raise the returns that an investor
obtains from investing in the country, reduce capital flight, and discourage
speculation. However, recently some prominent economists (Radelet and
Sachs 1998; Furman and Stiglitz 1998) have argued a revisionist view that
a rise in interest rates depreciates the exchange rate.
The revisionist view is that under the unique conditions of a financial
panic, tight monetary policies and high interest rates would result in capi-
tal outflows and exchange rate depreciation. That is, high interest rates
cause a financial implosion and raise default probabilities, causing capital
to flow out and weakening the currency. High rates can compromise the net
worth of many firms, and the bankruptcy of these firms can have adverse
eﬀects on the net worth of the firms’ creditors, especially that of domestic
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banks. In turn, as these banks fail and cut lending, credit can become con-
strained, further raising bankruptcies and causing capital to flee.
Recently, there has been much empirical work examining the interest
rate–exchange rate nexus in emerging-market countries during crisis. This
work can be divided into those using high-frequency (daily or weekly) time
series data and those using cross-country or panel data. As to the work us-
ing time series data, the results have generally been mixed. Goldfajn and
Baig (1998) and Dekle, Hsiao, and Wang (1999) find sharp evidence that in-
terest rates appreciate exchange rates, whereas Gould and Kamin (2000) are
unable to find a reliable relationship between interest rates and exchange
rates. As to the work using cross-country or panel data, the results are again
mixed. Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) find that high interest rates appreciate
the exchange rate, but only in countries with strong banking sectors. Fur-
man and Stiglitz (1998) find that if the sample is restricted to low-inflation
countries—which include East Asia—high interest rates lead to exchange
rate depreciations.
The paper by Kenneth West and Dongchul Cho is a significant advance
over the earlier work that uses time series data. The earlier work was non-
structural and simply ran vector autoregressions (VARs) of nominal ex-
change rates on nominal short-term interest rates. The work tried to infer
causality by testing whether changes in interest rates temporally preceded
(led) changes in exchange rates. The results from these VARs were fragile
and depended critically on sample frequency (daily or weekly), sample pe-
riod (starting and ending dates), and lag length. Moreover, given that both
exchange rates and interest rates are endogenous, forward-looking vari-
ables, it was diﬃcult to infer causality from simple leads and lags.
West and Cho’s paper significantly improves upon the earlier time series
work. The authors develop and estimate an explicit structural model of the
interest rate–exchange rate nexus. The West and Cho model contains three
equations. In addition to the usual uncovered interest rate parity equation
(their equation [1]), the model contains a monetary policy equation, in
which monetary authorities react to expected exchange rate depreciations
(equation [2]), and an equation relating the exchange rate risk premium to
the interest rate (equation [3]). Given explicit assumptions about expecta-
tions formation (model consistent, rational expectations), the timing of
monetary policy, and the nature of shocks, the parameters of the model can
be identified. The estimation of these equations allows for an explicit test of
the revisionist view: whether the risk premium increases in response to a rise
in interest rates, and if so, whether the response is strongly positive enough
to warrant a depreciation of the exchange rate.
West and Cho estimate their model on weekly data for Korea, the Philip-
pines, and Thailand. In Korea, exchange rate risk premiums are found to be
negatively related to interest rates, thus supporting the traditional view of
the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates. In the Philip-
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pines, risk premiums are positively related to interest rates, but not strongly
positive enough to warrant the reversal of the traditional view. In Thailand,
risk premiums are strongly positively related to interest rates, thus support-
ing the revisionist view. West and Cho vary their sample starting dates, and
although their parameter estimates are somewhat unstable, their conclu-
sions, based on their point estimates, are generally robust.
Some international economists may be surprised by West and Cho’s suc-
cess in finding a relationship between exchange and interest rates, especially
in emerging markets during crises. After all, it is well known that, in general,
there is no stable empirical short-run relationship between exchange and in-
terest rates, even in industrial countries, in tranquil times (Frankel and Rose
1995). Nominal exchange rates move as if they are a random walk. On
closer examination, however, West and Cho’s results appear consistent with
the earlier findings. In particular, West and Cho admit that their standard
error bands are very wide; for example, the sensitivity of Korea’s risk pre-
mium to the interest rate is –8.87, with a 90 percent confidence interval of 
–27.7 to 14.2. Varying the sample period results in a diﬀerent sensitivity,
implying some parameter instability, just as in earlier findings. Moreover,
given the large standard error bands, should the West and Cho model be
used to predict exchange rates, the predictive performance (root mean
squared error) of their model would probably be inferior to that of a simple
random walk.
I have two minor quibbles with the underlying assumptions of West and
Cho’s model. First, the solution to West and Cho’s model imposes rational
expectations. Thus, agents are assumed to know not only the model, but the
parameters and the shock processes of the model as well. Although this may
be a reasonable assumption for industrialized economies in tranquil times,
for emerging markets in crisis, the rational expectations assumption may be
too strong. For most East Asian countries, the crisis was an unexpected,
one-oﬀ event. The residents in these countries had no experience with crisis
regimes. Thus it is unlikely that the residents would know or be able to esti-
mate the parameters of the model.
Second, in West and Cho’s monetary policy reaction function, equation
(2), the monetary authorities’ interest rate rule is assumed to depend solely
on the expected depreciation rate. As the authors acknowledge, during the
Asian crisis the monetary authorities also cared about additional variables,
such as the levels of economic activity and foreign exchange reserves. For
example, during the crisis period in Korea, the authorities were carefully
observing daily bankruptcies in the Seoul area, as a measure of economic
activity, and the level of foreign exchange reserves. Figure 1C.1 shows that
during the crisis period, the authorities’ monetary control variable, the
overnight call rate, was positively correlated with daily bankruptcies and
negatively correlated with reserves.
Strong assumptions, however, are necessary in any useful model. To un-
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derscore the usefulness of the West and Cho model in understanding the in-
terest rate–exchange rate nexus during the Asian crisis, examine figure 1C.2.
The figure shows the correlation between the Korean overnight call rate and
the default premiums on Korean sovereign bonds. From the figure it is diﬃ-
cult to draw any firm conclusions about the relationship between interest
rates and the default premiums. The default premiums are positively corre-
lated with the interest rate, thus tending to support the revisionist view.
However, the default premiums temporally lead the interest rate, rather
than lagging, which casts doubt on whether the interest rate is causing
changes in the default premiums. West and Cho’s model shows that if mon-
etary authorities are, as it were, leaning against the wind in expected ex-
change rate depreciations, the interest rate rises, and the exchange rate ap-
preciates with a lag in response to a risk premium shock (their figures 1.3
and 1.4). Interest rates and exchange rates are positively correlated, and this
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Fig. 1C.1 Korea: Bankruptcies, reserves, and interest rates
Fig. 1C.2 Korea: Default premia and interest rates
correlation is a result of monetary authorities’ actively raising the interest
rate. Thus, if observed default premiums on Korean bonds are contempo-
raneously correlated with risk premium shocks, the pattern observed in fig-
ure 1C.2 is certainly consistent with the traditional view of the interest rate–
exchange rate nexus.
In sum, the West and Cho paper is very useful in understanding the in-
terest rate–exchange rate nexus during the East Asian crisis. It should be-
come the standard reference on this topic.
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Discussion Summary
Jeﬀrey Shafer suggested that specific histories and observations are often
helpful in terms of understanding economic relationships. He added that an
interest rate increase often stabilizes the exchange rate, whereas a subse-
quent premature lowering of the interest rate will destroy credibility.
Yung Chul Park made reference to figure 1.5 of the paper and noted that
Korean interest rates and exchange rates were stabilized around February
1998. He argued that debt restructuring was the cause of the observed sta-
bilization.
Martin Feldstein remarked that the real question is not just whether the
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interest rate can stabilize the currency but whether it makes sense to let the
interest rate increase when we consider the adverse eﬀects on the economy.
Andrew K. Rose remarked that he was generally suspicious of case-study
approaches, although he agreed with the conclusion of the paper, that in-
terest rate defense does seem to work.
Martin Feldstein pointed to Sweden and Turkey as examples of regions
where interest rate defense didn’t work. Allan Drazen concurred and em-
phasized the issue of sample selection bias.
Robert P. Flood suggested that the authors take account of diﬀerences in
fundamentals.
Michael M. Hutchison remarked that the argument for or against interest
rate defense depends on the state of the financial sector and the debt posi-
tions of the country. He added that the type of debt structure matters as
well.
Edwin M. Truman made a reference to Turkey’s failed interest rate de-
fense and remarked that the political implications of an interest rate defense
should not be overlooked. Shafer added that Turkey’s unwillingness to
supply reserves to banks that were being squeezed in the interbank market
for the financial sector caused the failure.
Andrew Berg pointed to the diﬀerence between the defense of a peg and
a crisis in a free float. He added that the degree of capital mobility is essen-
tial in thinking about the interest rate defense.
Peter B. Kenen remarked that the timing of the introduction of the IMF
programs diﬀered across countries under attack. He concurred with Tru-
man and asked whether the exchange rate depreciation or the interest rate
increase will hurt the economy the most.
Kenneth D. West agreed with Shafer and Park that there is useful coun-
try-specific information. He agreed with Feldstein that the fundamental
question is what constitutes good monetary policy; the Cho and West pa-
per considers an important element of the answer to this question. He em-
phasized that the Cho and West paper allows for interest rate hikes to be
associated with either exchange rate appreciations or depreciations. In re-
sponse to Rose, he pointed out that the Cho and West paper provides for the
possibility that variation in exchange rate risk premiums dominates ex-
change rate movements, thus allowing a stronger result than the work that
Rose cited on the interest rate defense during crises. He agreed with the
comments of several participants that in future work it would be useful to
study countries with failed stabilization programs.
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